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I. EXECUTIVE SUMMARY 
 
 Most cities are structured through one of two different forms of government: “council-
manager” and “strong-mayor.”1 In council-manager cities, the mayor and each council member 
has equal strength in developing policy.2 The city manager handles the day-to-day community 
operations, including making all personnel decisions.3 The strong-mayor system is modeled after 
state and federal governments, so the mayor leads as a governor or the president would, and the 
city council acts as the legislature.4 As a result, the mayor does not have a vote, but does have 
veto power.5 Most large city governments, including New York City, Los Angeles, Chicago, and 
San Francisco, have a strong-mayor form of government.6 
 
Measure L, which is on the ballot in the city of Sacramento, aims to change the 
government structure from council-manager to strong-mayor.7 Revisions under Measure L 
would include removing the mayor’s vote on the city council, but giving the mayor veto power 
over ordinances and the city budget; vesting power akin to that of a chief executive officer in the 
mayor, rather than the city manager; conferring the power to make personnel decisions, 
including appointing and removing the city manager, to the mayor; and imposing term limits on 
the mayor and council members.8 
 
Proponents state a strong-mayor government would create more accountability, place 
checks and balances on the government, and help modernize Sacramento.9 Opponents, however, 
insist putting the ultimate power over city government into the hands of one elected official will 
make it easier for special interests to influence decision making.10 In addition, they feel the 
“system is working well…if it’s not broken, don’t break it.”11 This article will discuss 
                                                 
1 STRONG MAYOR-COUNCIL INSTITUTE, STRUCTURES, http://strongmayorcouncil.org/structures.html (last 
visited Sept. 13, 2014). 
2 Cal. City Mgmt. Foundation and Int’l City/County Mgmt. Ass’n, Council-Manager or “Strong Mayor”: 
The Choice is Clear (2001), https://icma.org/Documents/Document/Document/302618. 
3 Id. 
4 Structures, STRONG MAYOR-COUNCIL INSTITUTE, http://strongmayorcouncil.org/structures.html (last 
visited Sept. 13, 2014). 
5 Id. 
6 STRONG MAYOR-COUNCIL INSTITUTE, TOP 25 CITIES (2012) available at 
http://strongmayorcouncil.org/images/City_List_Top_25_2011_Publication.pdf. 
7 SACRAMENTO, CAL. CITY COUNCIL RES. NO. 2013-0362, EXHIBIT A (2013), available at 
http://portal.cityofsacramento.org/~/media/Corporate/Files/City-
Clerk/Elections/07142014_MeasureText_Charter.pdf. 
8 CITY OF SACRAMENTO, IMPARTIAL ANALYSIS OF MEASURE L PREPARED BY SACRAMENTO CITY 
ATTORNEY 1–2 (2014), available at http://portal.cityofsacramento.org/~/media/Files/City-
Clerk/Elections/MeasureL_ImpartialAnalysis.pdf [“IMPARTIAL ANALYSIS”]. 
9 CITY OF SACRAMENTO, ARGUMENT IN FAVOR OF MEASURE L, available at 
http://portal.cityofsacramento.org/~/media/Files/City-Clerk/Elections/MeasureL_For.pdf [“IN FAVOR”]. 
10 CITY OF SACRAMENTO, REBUTTAL TO ARGUMENT IN FAVOR OF MEASURE L, available at 
http://portal.cityofsacramento.org/~/media/Files/City-Clerk/Elections/MeasureL_RebuttalAGAINST.pdf 
[“REBUTTAL TO FAVOR”]. 
11 “Strong Mayor” Forum, Sierra Curtis Neighborhood Ass’n (Sept. 22, 2014) [“Forum”] (statement of 
council member Steve Hansen) (notes on file with the California Initiative Review). 
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Sacramento’s current government, the history of strong-mayor in Sacramento, how Measure L 
would change the law, constitutional and charter implications of the initiative, and public policy 
considerations.12 
 
II. CURRENT LAW 
 
In California, all incorporated cities are what are known as “general law” cities, unless 
the electorate of a city opts to be what is called a “charter city.”13 Sacramento is a charter city.14 
 
A. Charter Cities  
 
In operation, a city’s charter is analogous to a state’s or country’s constitution.15 A city 
charter provides both broad authority and vestment of powers in a governing body, as well as 
acts as “an instrument of limitation on the broad power of charter cities over municipal affairs.”16 
The city’s electorate must approve the charter and any revisions.17 Only conflicting provisions in 
the state or federal constitutions, or any state statute on a matter of statewide concern can 
preempt the laws contained in a city’s charter.18 
 
The California Constitution grants cities the authority to adopt a charter.19 Once a charter 
is adopted, a charter city has the power to create and regulate a police force and conduct 
municipal elections, and broad authority over its governmental structure, including all aspects of 
employment.20 
 
The 482 incorporated cities in California have either one of two forms of municipal 
governmental structure: the “council-manager” structure or the “strong-mayor” structure.21 
General law cities must operate under the council-manager structure.22 While charter cities have 
the option of adopting either structural format, of California’s 120 charter-cities, “only five use 
the true strong-mayor form.”23 
 
// 
// 
// 
 
                                                 
12 Infra Sections II–VI. 
13 CAL. CONST. art. XI, § 3. 
14 See EILEEN TEICHERT AND MATTHEW RUYAK, PROPOSED 2012 CHARTER REVISION ANALYSIS 6 
(2012), available at http://www.cityofsacramento.org/cityattorney/documents/StaffReport1_17_12.pdf 
[“2012 ANALYSIS”] (stating the charter “operates as a ‘Constitution’”). 
15 See id. at 7 (stating the charter “operates as a ‘Constitution’”). 
16 Id. 
17 Id. 
18 Id. 
19 CAL. CONST. art. XI, § 3. 
20 2012 ANALYSIS, supra note 14, at 7. 
21 Id. 
22 CAL. GOV’T CODE § 34409 (West 2014). 
23 2012 ANALYSIS, supra note 14, at 7. 
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B. Current Sacramento Charter Law 
 
Like all city charters, Sacramento’s presiding document identifies a governing body, and 
vests widespread powers in it.24  
 
1. The City Council: Article III 
 
In its most-current version, Sacramento’s charter vests authority in the nine-member city 
council to act as the governing body of the city.25 The council comprises eight members, each 
elected from one of eight districts within the city limits.26 The ninth member of the council is the 
mayor.27 The city council is the legislative body within municipal government, and is vested 
with various powers including the power to propose and adopt city ordinances to be contained 
within the municipal code, reapportion and redistrict council-seat districts, conduct investigations 
into the affairs of city government, and conduct legislative business at public meetings.28 
Currently, council members are not subject to any term limits.29 
 
2. The Mayor: Article IV 
 
The mayor is the “presiding officer of the city.”30 While he or she is a voting member of 
the council, the mayor also assumes the leadership role in relations between city government and 
the citizens of Sacramento.31 In effect, the mayor of Sacramento is seemingly intended as a 
position that will guide the council in the administration of its legislative duties, ensuring the 
priorities of the city’s citizens are furthered, all while maintaining a position of equal-footing 
with other members of the council.32 The charter also grants specific powers and duties to the 
mayor, including that he or she may propose ordinances and resolutions for the council to 
consider and shall appoint and may remove members of boards, commissions, and advisory 
agencies.33 The mayor is elected to a term of four years.34 Currently, there are no term limits for 
this office.35  
 
3. The City Manager: Article V 
 
Under the charter, the city manager is vested with the role and responsibility of being the 
city’s chief executive officer, overseeing the numerous departments that make up Sacramento’s 
municipal government.36 In essence, the city manager is responsible for the city’s day-to-day 
                                                 
24 SACRAMENTO, CAL. CHARTER, art. II §§ 10, § 20–21. 
25 Id., art. III, § 20–21. 
26 Id., art. III, § 21. 
27 Id. 
28 Id., art. III, §§ 24–25, 31–32, 34. 
29 Id., art. III, §26. 
30 Id., art. IV, § 40. 
31 Id., art. IV, § 40(b)(2). 
32 Id., art. IV, § 40(b)(2)–(5). 
33 Id., art. IV, § 40(b)(6)–(7). 
34 Id., art. IV, § 42–43. 
35 Id., art. IV, § 43. 
36 Id., art. V, § 61(b). 
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administration.37 In addition, the charter vests in the city manager various powers and duties, 
including the responsibility to ensure that all laws and ordinances are enforced; to act as an 
advisor to the city council; to oversee and manage contracts, leases, and permits that the city 
council enters into for goods and services; and to propose the annual city budget.38 
 
Sacramento’s charter anticipates the need for separation of powers because it expressly 
prohibits the council from circumventing the city manager to work with any part of city 
government under the manager’s direction and supervision, including any attempts to appoint or 
hire any city officer or employee.39 Similarly, the charter provides for checks on the authority of 
the city manager through its grant of investigatory power to the city council.40 In order to remove 
the city manager from office, at least six city council members must approve his or her 
termination.41 
 
4. The Annual Budget: Article IX 
 
Under the existing charter, the city manager develops and proposes the city’s budget for 
presentation to the city council not less than 60 days prior to start of each fiscal year.42 The city 
council then considers the budget recommendations during public hearings, and ultimately votes 
by resolution to adopt a budget for the upcoming fiscal year.43 
 
III. HISTORY OF STRONG-MAYOR 
 
A. Strong-Mayor Government in Other Cities 
 
 Many city government structures were originally based on the executive and legislative 
branches of the federal government, but moved toward council-manager governance in the wake 
of a number of mayoral corruption scandals in the early 1900s.44 
 
 Since the early 1990s, cities with more than 100,000 residents have steadily adopted 
strong-mayor systems.45 One reason is that growing cities have growing numbers of interest 
groups, and it is easier to have one person as a point-of-contact for those groups.46 
 
                                                 
37 2012 ANALYSIS, supra note 14, at 17. 
38 SACRAMENTO, CAL. CHARTER, art. V, § 61(a), (c), (g), (i).  
39 Id., art. V, § 62. 
40 Id., art. V, § 62(a). 
41 Id., art. V, § 63. 
42 Id., art. IX, § 111(a). 
43 Id. 
44 J.T. Long, A Short History of the Strong Mayor in California, PUBLIC CEO (Sept. 3, 2009), 
http://www.publicceo.com/2009/09/a-short-history-of-the-strong-mayor-in-california/. 
45 Structural Trends, STRONG MAYOR-COUNCIL INSTITUTE, 
http://strongmayorcouncil.org/structuraltrends.html (last visited Sept. 13, 2014). 
46 Lisa Nisenson, Romper Room: The Strong Mayor Versus Strong City Manager Debate, THIS WEEK IN 
SARASOTA (July 27, 2012), http://www.thisweekinsarasota.com/2012/07/romper-room-the-strong-mayor-
versus-strong-city-manager-debate/. 
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Not all cities have embraced the trend.47 Columbia, South Carolina voters defeated a 
strong-mayor initiative last year despite support from the governor, Chamber of Commerce, and 
other mayors across the state.48 Large cities like Baltimore, Dallas, Indianapolis, Phoenix, and 
San Antonio maintain their council-manager systems.49 El Paso, Texas abandoned its strong-
mayor system in 2004, while Topeka, Kansas and Cedar Rapids, Iowa chose to adopt council-
manager governance when replacing their commission governments.50 Portland retains a 
council-manager form of government because voters there think “shared leadership is better than 
centralized power.”51 
 
 In California, five cities have adopted a strong-mayor system: Fresno, Los Angeles, 
Oakland, San Diego, and San Francisco.52 Their structures vary; for example, Fresno and 
Oakland still have a city manager, while the other cities place all management decisions in the 
mayor’s hands.53 
 
There is mixed feedback regarding California’s strong-mayor systems.54 Critics of 
Oakland’s system assert the charter is vague and creates uncertainty regarding which public 
official has responsibility over certain departments.55 Former Fresno mayor Karen Humphrey 
regrets her role in that city’s adoption of a strong-mayor system.56 On the other hand, San 
Diego’s strong-mayor governance successfully made it through a five-year trial period.57 Voters 
permanently adopted the structure in 2010, but made some changes, including adding a ninth 
council seat to prevent tie votes.58 There have, however, been abuses of power in San Diego 
since that permanent adoption.59 
 
                                                 
47 Pat Lynch, Strong Mayor, EAST SACRAMENTO PRESERVATION (Sept. 22, 2014), 
http://eastsacpreservation.org/strong-mayor/. 
48 Id. 
49 STRONG MAYOR-COUNCIL INSTITUTE, TOP 25 CITIES (2012) available at 
http://strongmayorcouncil.org/images/City_List_Top_25_2011_Publication.pdf. 
50 Structural Trends, STRONG MAYOR-COUNCIL INSTITUTE, 
http://strongmayorcouncil.org/structuraltrends.html (last visited Sept. 13, 2014). 
51 Lynch, supra note 47. 
52 J.T. Long, A Short History of the Strong Mayor in California, PUBLIC CEO (Sept. 3, 2009), 
http://www.publicceo.com/2009/09/a-short-history-of-the-strong-mayor-in-california/. 
53 Id. 
54 See, e.g., J. Douglas Allen-Taylor, Undercurrents: Oakland’s ‘Strong-Mayor’ Charter Ambiguous as to 
Mayor’s Duties, BERKELEY DAILY PLANET (Feb. 11, 2010, 9:46 AM), 
http://www.berkeleydailyplanet.com/issue/2010-02-11/article/34636?headline=Undercurrents-Oakland-s-
Strong-Mayor-Charter-Ambiguous-As-to-Mayor-s-Duties--By-J.-Douglas-Allen-Taylor- (voicing 
concerns that the mayor’s power is unclear). 
55 Id. 
56 Forum, supra note 11 (statement of council member Steve Hansen). 
57 A History of San Diego Government, OFFICE OF THE CITY CLERK, http://www.sandiego.gov/city-
clerk/aboutus/history.shtml (last visited Oct. 5, 2014). 
58 Id. 
59 Monica Garske, R. Stickney, and Gene Cubbison, Former San Diego Mayor Bob Filner Sentenced, 
NBC SAN DIEGO (Dec. 9, 2013, 8:17 PM), http://www.nbcsandiego.com/news/local/Former-Mayor-Bob-
Filner-to-Be-Sentenced-Monday-234905381.html. 
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Despite the opinions on each side regarding the effectiveness of a strong-mayor structure 
in other California cities, research has shown the system to be equally as effective as council-
manager governance.60 Both forms of government generally champion citizens’ needs in equal 
ways.61 No form of government is perfect, but both can be successful as long as those elected put 
the needs of the people first.62 
 
B. Sacramento’s Prior Strong-Mayor Governments 
 
In 1849, the electorate of the soon-to-be formed City of Sacramento voted to adopt the 
Sacramento City Charter, thereby establishing Sacramento as a municipality.63 The charter 
reflected voters’ desires to move away from the alcalde court system, which the Treaty of 
Guadalupe Hidalgo established, and to implement a form of governance more reflective of the 
democratic process in the local governments of the eastern states from which they had 
emigrated.64 The form of government created was analogous to today’s strong-mayor form of 
government.65 Borrowing from the Spanish tradition, the 1849 charter created a “council-
alcalde” system.66 An “alcalde” is a traditional municipal magistrate who had both judicial and 
administrative functions.67 In the modern Spanish language, alcalde is the equivalent of the 
English word mayor.68  
 
The council-alcalde form of government in Sacramento was brief; the Legislature passed 
a law in 1858 that consolidated city and county governments into one municipal system.69 In 
                                                 
60 Sam Sturgis, Strong Mayor, Weak Mayor, No Mayor—In Terms of Policy, It May Not Matter Much, 
CITY LAB (July 31, 2014), http://www.citylab.com/politics/2014/07/strong-mayor-weak-mayor-no-
mayorin-terms-of-policy-it-may-not-matter-much/375347/. 
61 Id. 
62 Lisa Nisenson, Romper Room: The Strong Mayor versus Strong City Manager Debate, THIS WEEK IN 
SARASOTA (July 27, 2012), http://www.thisweekinsarasota.com/2012/07/romper-room-the-strong-mayor-
versus-strong-city-manager-debate/. 
63 Kathryn Gaeddert, Introduction, For the Record: Catalog of the Public Records, City of Sacramento 
1849–1982, Sacramento County, 1848–1982, CENTER FOR SACRAMENTO HISTORY, at 3 (Mar. 1, 1982), 
available at http://pdf.oac.cdlib.org/pdf/samcc/forrecor.pdf. 
64 Id. 
65 Interview with Phil Isenberg, former mayor, City of Sacramento, in Sacramento, Cal. (Oct. 2, 2014) 
[“Isenberg interview”] (notes on file with the California Initiative Review); Your City in Action! The City 
of Sacramento Charter Revision, LIBRARY BUZZ (Aug. 20, 2009), 
http://apps.lib.csus.edu/blogs/blog/2009/08/20/your-city-in-action-the-city-of-sacramento-charter-
revision/. 
66 Isenberg interview, supra note 65; Your City in Action! The City of Sacramento Charter Revision, 
LIBRARY BUZZ (Aug. 20, 2009), http://apps.lib.csus.edu/blogs/blog/2009/08/20/your-city-in-action-the-
city-of-sacramento-charter-revision/. 
67 Alcalde, ENCYCLOPEDIA BRITTANICA, http://www.britannica.com/EBchecked/topic/13206/alcalde (last 
visited Oct. 5, 2014). 
68 Id. 
69 Isenberg interview, supra note 65; NELLIE MAY HENDERSON COLE, CONSOLIDATION OF SACRAMENTO 
CITY AND COUNTY GOVERNMENT, 1858–1863 (1958). 
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1863, that radical change was overturned, and Sacramento returned to a mayor-council form of 
governance, which lasted until 1911.70  
 
Although the city governance change several times throughout the century, it took until 
1989 for a citizen commission to recommend a strong-mayor system in Sacramento, along with a 
return to a consolidated city and county government.71 Thus, the “new” concept of a strong-
mayor system in Sacramento is actually not new at all, but rather reflects the ebb and flow of 
ideas regarding forms of governance.72 
 
C. Recent Sacramento Strong-Mayor Proposals 
 
 Prior to Measure L, there were three strong-mayor proposals, beginning with a version 
Sacramento Mayor Kevin Johnson advocated for shortly after taking office in 2008.73  
 
1. 2009 Citizen Initiative 
 
In 2009, the city council voted to support a citizen-proposed strong-mayor initiative if 
enough citizen support was gathered through petition circulation to place it on the June 2010 
ballot.74 The measure would have given the mayor power akin to that of a chief executive 
officer. The mayor would have taken on the duties of the city manager, including preparing 
budgets and appointing and removing the city manager, clerk, treasurer, and attorney, as well as 
most other city employees.75 The mayor no longer would have been a member of the city 
council, but would have been able to veto council decisions.76 To ensure that there would not be 
a tie vote in city council decisions, a ninth district would have been added.77  
 
At the same time that the council voiced its support for the initiative, the council 
recognized that the measure, as drafted, could have been unconstitutional.78 The initiative would 
have altered nine articles of the Sacramento City Charter.79 The breadth of these changes would 
                                                 
70 Isenberg interview, supra note 65; Your City in Action! The City of Sacramento Charter Revision, 
LIBRARY BUZZ (Aug. 20, 2009), http://apps.lib.csus.edu/blogs/blog/2009/08/20/your-city-in-action-the-
city-of-sacramento-charter-revision/. 
71 Ed Salzman, Mayors Move to Power in California City Halls, L.A. TIMES (July 23, 1989), 
http://articles.latimes.com/1989-07-23/opinion/op-115_1_city-council-member. 
72 Isenberg interview, supra note 65. 
73 Craig Powell, Welcome Back, Strong Mayor, INSIDE PUBLICATIONS (Nov. 30, 2013), 
http://www.insidepublications.org/index.php/inside-city-hall/522-welcome-back-strong-mayor [“Powell”]  
Mayor Kevin Johnson, CITY OF SACRAMENTO, http://portal.cityofsacramento.org/Mayor-
Council/Districts/Mayor (last visited Sept. 1, 2014). 
74 EILEEN TEICHERT, STRONG MAYOR INITIATIVE LEGAL ISSUES AND OPTIONS 3 (2009), available at 
http://sacramento.granicus.com/MetaViewer.php?view_id=22&clip_id=2085&meta_id=184461 
[“TEICHERT”]. 
75 Id. at 3–4. 
76 Id. at 4. 
77 Id. 
78 Id. at 3. 
79 Id. at 7. 
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have amounted to a city charter revision, rather than an amendment.80 Since the California 
Constitution does not allow a city to revise its charter through the initiative process unless its city 
council places the measure on the ballot, the proposed initiative could have been found 
unconstitutional.81 Despite a warning from the city attorney regarding the possible 
unconstitutionality of the measure, it was placed on the ballot.82 
 
 As a result, Bill Camp of the Sacramento Central Labor Council filed suit for a 
preliminary injunction to prevent a vote on the initiative before its constitutionality was 
adjudicated.83 The parties ultimately agreed that the initiative the electorate proposed was 
beyond voters’ power, so city officials removed it from the ballot, but the council did create a 
charter review committee to make recommendations for future charter revisions.84 
 
2. 2010 Council Proposal 
 
 When the citizen-driven initiative was enjoined, the city council did consider placing a 
new charter revision on the June 2010 ballot.85 That version would not have given the mayor 
power to appoint the city attorney and other employees.86 However, it would still have limited 
the number of terms to which the mayor and council members could be elected and given the 
mayor appointment power for the city manager position.87 The revisions would have had a 
“sunset,” or expiration date, without voter re-approval.88 The city council did not vote to place 
the measure on the ballot, much to Mayor Johnson’s disappointment, because members said the 
mayor had not presented any evidence that the existing council-manager system was not 
working.89  
 
                                                 
80 Id. at 5, 7–10. 
81 Id. at 5, 10. 
82 Camp v. Sacramento, No. 34-2009-00065404, at 3 (Cal. Super. Ct. Sacramento Jan. 21, 2010) (order 
granting preliminary injunction). 
83 Id. 
84 Camp v. Sacramento, No. 34-2009-00065404 (Cal. Super. Ct. Sacramento filed Dec. 15, 2010) 
(stipulated judgment); WILLIAM EDGAR ET AL., SACRAMENTO CHARTER REVIEW COMMITTEE FINAL 
REPORT 24 (2009), http://www.cityofsacramento.org/charter/documents/CRC_Final_Report.pdf 
[“EDGAR”]. 
85 KUNAL MERCHANT, REPORT BACK: CHARTER REFORM PACKAGE 2 (2010), available at 
http://sacramento.granicus.com/MetaViewer.php?view_id=22&clip_id=2205&meta_id=191740. 
86 Kathleen Haley, Johnson Aims to Put Strong Mayor Plan on November Ballot, SACRAMENTO PRESS 
(Feb. 16, 2010, 2:02 PM), http://sacramentopress.com/2010/02/16/johnson-aims-to-put-strong-mayor-
plan-on-november-ballot/. 
87 Id. 
88 KUNAL MERCHANT, REPORT BACK: CHARTER REFORM PACKAGE 1 (2010), available at 
http://sacramento.granicus.com/MetaViewer.php?view_id=22&clip_id=2205&meta_id=191740. 
89 Nick Miller, Sacramento City Council Approves Strong Mayor Vote for 2014 at Drama-Free Meeting 
(Boring! So Let’s Watch an Old Video of K.J. Chewing out his Colleagues), SACRAMENTO NEWS & 
REVIEW (Nov. 6, 2013, 2:34 PM), 
http://www.newsreview.com/sacramento/pageburner/blogs/post?oid=11973042; Sacramento Council 
Votes Against Strong-Mayor Plan, RECORDNET.COM (June 23, 2010, 8:42 AM), 
http://www.recordnet.com/apps/pbcs.dll/article?AID=/20100623/A_NEWS/100629945. 
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3. 2012 Expanded Council Proposal 
 
After the initial attempts to place a measure on the 2010 ballot did not move forward, 
Mayor Johnson introduced a different proposal in 2012, which similarly did not make it to the 
ballot.90 The new mayoral powers that would have been granted were largely the same, but the 
plan would have added a ninth council district and council seat, as well as created an “at-large” 
council member position, bringing the total number of council seats to ten.91 The at-large 
member would have been elected city-wide, just like the mayor, and would have cast votes on 
behalf of the entire city since the mayor would no longer be able to vote.92 Because there would 
have been an even number of council members, however, the mayor would have been able to 
cast tie-breaker votes.93  
 
4. 2014 Measure L 
 
For the latest iteration, Sacramento Tomorrow took over the movement to promote a 
strong-mayor government in the city.94 The group and its 28 advisory committee members 
worked to create a new proposal, and planned to reach out to the community for feedback.95 
Very little feedback was sought, however, and voters did not have a chance to review the group’s 
recommendations.96 
 
In November 2013, the Sacramento City Council approved a resolution to place a 
revision to the city charter on the November 2014 ballot.97 That resolution ultimately became 
Measure L.98 The resolution is very similar to Mayor Johnson’s last proposal, but with slight 
changes, including a limit of three terms for the mayor, rather than two.99 Four council 
members—Angelique Ashby, Steve Cohn, Jay Schenirer, and Allen Warren—and Mayor 
Johnson voted in support, while council members Darrell Fong, Steve Hansen, Kevin McCarty, 
and Bonnie Pannell opposed the resolution.100 Council member Hansen is now leading the 
charge against Measure L with support from former Sacramento mayors Anne Rudin and 
Heather Fargo, the League of Women Voters, and the Democratic Party of Sacramento County, 
                                                 
90 See Powell, supra note 73 (stating that the court stopped the first proposal in 2009 and the city council 
did not support proposals in 2010 and 2012). 
91 Antonio Harvey, City Council Votes Against Strong Mayor, For Charter Commission, SACRAMENTO 
OBSERVER (Feb. 8, 2012), http://sacobserver.com/2012/02/city-council-votes-against-strong-mayor-for-
charter-commission/. 
92 Id. 
93 Id. 
94 Powell, supra note 73. 
95 Id. 
96 Id.; Interview with Matthew Ruyak, Assistant City Attorney, City of Sacramento, in Sacramento, Cal. 
(Sept. 3, 2014) (notes on file with the California Initiative Review). 
97 SACRAMENTO CITY COUNCIL RES. NO. 2013–0362, at 3 (2013). 
98 Ryan Lillis, Sacramento Councilman Steve Hansen to Lead Opposition to Strong-Mayor Plan, 
SACRAMENTO BEE (Aug. 19, 2014, 12:00 a.m.), 
http://www.sacbee.com/2014/08/19/6637677/sacramento-councilman-steve-hansen.html [“Lillis-
Hansen”]. 
99 Powell, supra note 73. 
100 SACRAMENTO CITY COUNCIL RES. NO. 2013–0362, at 3 (2013). 
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while Mayor Johnson has found allies in state Senator Darrell Steinberg, former Sacramento 
mayor Phil Isenberg, former New York City Mayor Michael Bloomberg, and several unions.101 
 
IV. PROPOSED LAW 
 
 Measure L seeks to enact significant changes to the roles of the city council, mayor, and 
city manager, as well as how the budget is proposed and approved.102 
 
A. The City Council: Article III 
 
Measure L would reduce the size of the city council from nine to eight council members, 
removing the mayor as a member.103 As such, this new composition of council members has the 
potential to lead to ties on ordinances and other measures that come before the body for a vote.104 
Measure L does not provide a provision to remedy tie votes that result from a council of eight 
members.105 
The council would also be required to elect a president and vice president from amongst 
its members.106 In the mayor’s absence from the city, the president and vice president would 
serve as mayor in their respective order, and would assume all the vested rights and powers of 
the mayor with the significant exceptions of “the power of any veto or any other discretionary 
privilege that is enjoyed” by the mayor.107 
 
The enactment of Measure L would impose term limits on council members.108 
Specifically, each city council member would only be permitted to serve three, four-year 
terms.109 This change would not apply retroactively to terms already served by existing council 
members.110 
 
                                                 
101 Lillis-Hansen, supra note 98; CITY OF SACRAMENTO, ARGUMENT AGAINST MEASURE L, available at 
http://portal.cityofsacramento.org/~/media/Files/City-Clerk/Elections/MeasureL_Against.pdf 
[“AGAINST”]; CITY OF SACRAMENTO, REBUTTAL TO ARGUMENT AGAINST MEASURE L, available at 
http://portal.cityofsacramento.org/~/media/Files/City-Clerk/Elections/MeasureL_Against.pdf 
[“REBUTTAL TO AGAINST”]. 
102 SACRAMENTO, CAL. CITY COUNCIL RES. NO. 2013-0362, EXHIBIT A (2013), available at 
http://portal.cityofsacramento.org/~/media/Corporate/Files/City-
Clerk/Elections/07142014_MeasureText_Charter.pdf. 
103 Id. § 21 (amending SACRAMENTO, CAL. CHARTER, art. III, § 21 and adding SACRAMENTO, CAL. 
CHARTER, art. IV, § 47). 
104 Forum, supra note 11 (statements of council member Steve Hansen and Nancy Miller, partner, Miller 
& Owen). 
105 Id. 
106 SACRAMENTO, CAL. CITY COUNCIL RES. NO. 2013-0362, EXHIBIT A, § 21 (2013), available at 
http://portal.cityofsacramento.org/~/media/Corporate/Files/City-
Clerk/Elections/07142014_MeasureText_Charter.pdf (amending SACRAMENTO, CAL. CHARTER, art. IV, 
§ 45). 
107 Id. § 19 (amending SACRAMENTO, CAL. CHARTER, art. IV, § 45). 
108 Id. § 7 (amending SACRAMENTO, CAL. CHARTER, art. III, § 26). 
109 Id. 
110 Id. 
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In addition, Measure L seeks to add two requirements relating to community interaction 
and involvement.111 First, Measure L would require that the city council hold at least two of its 
city council meetings per year outside of its chambers.112 The purpose of this requirement is to 
“improve citizen involvement and accessibility to [council] meetings.”113 The revision would 
also require voter approval for increases in council member compensation that exceed five 
percent.114 Second, Measure L would require the city council to establish by ordinance a 
“Neighborhood Advisory Committee,” with the intended purpose of “considering the interests of 
the city’s neighborhoods.”115 The text of Measure L does not elaborate on the intended duties or 
responsibilities of this committee, and thus it is not clear what the scope of this newly-
established body would be.116 
 
B. The Mayor: Article IV 
 
Under Measure L, the position of mayor would be transformed from being a largely 
symbolic “presiding officer,” to the role of the city’s chief executive officer.117 In addition, the 
basic description of the mayor’s role would be expanded to provide that he or she “shall have the 
executive and administrative authorities, powers, and responsibilities of the city as provided 
herein, including but not limited to the power and duty to execute and enforce all laws, 
ordinances, and polices of the city.”118 Measure L would make specific changes to the mayor’s 
“authorities, powers, and responsibilities,” as they relate to the city’s annual budget, the mayor’s 
place and role within the governance structure, the mayor’s administrative powers, and the 
mayor’s interaction and community involvement.119 A mayor would be limited to three, four-
year terms.120 This limit, however, would not apply retroactively to the current mayor’s 
previously-served terms.121 
 
1. The Mayor’s Interaction with the City Council 
 
As discussed above,122 Measure L would remove the mayor as a voting member of the 
city council, thereby reducing the number of council members from nine to eight.123 In the 
mayor’s new role, he or she would retain the right, but would not be obligated, to “attend and be 
                                                 
111 Id. §§ 11, 16 (amending SACRAMENTO, CAL. CHARTER, art. III, §§ 31, 38). 
112 Id. § 11 (amending SACRAMENTO, CAL. CHARTER, art. III, § 31). 
113 Id. 
114 Id. § 10 (amending SACRAMENTO, CAL. CHARTER, art. III, § 29). 
115 Id. § 16 (adding SACRAMENTO, CAL. CHARTER, art. III, § 38). 
116 Id.; Interview with Steve Hansen, council member, City of Sacramento, in Sacramento, Cal. (Sept. 30, 
2014) [“Hansen interview”] (notes on file with the California Initiative Review). 
117 SACRAMENTO, CAL. CITY COUNCIL RES. NO. 2013-0362, EXHIBIT A, § 17 (2013), available at 
http://portal.cityofsacramento.org/~/media/Corporate/Files/City-
Clerk/Elections/07142014_MeasureText_Charter.pdf (amending SACRAMENTO, CAL. CHARTER, art. IV, 
§ 40). 
118 Id. 
119 Id. 
120 Id. § 18 (amending SACRAMENTO, CAL. CHARTER, art. IV, § 43). 
121 Id. 
122 Supra Part IV.A. 
123 Id. § 21 (amending SACRAMENTO, CAL. CHARTER, art. III, § 21). 
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heard” at city council meetings.124 The mayor would not have a right to vote on matters before 
the council.125 Because the mayor is no longer a member of the council, the newly composed 
council of eight members presents the opportunity for tie votes on ordinances and other measures 
that come before the body.126 Measure L, however, does not provide a remedy for how tie votes 
will be broken.127 
 
2. The Annual Budget 
 
Measure L would transfer the responsibility and power to propose the city’s annual 
budget from the city manager to the mayor.128 The mayor would be required to propose an 
annual budget to the city council no later than 90 days before the start of each fiscal year.129 
Following the city council’s review, alteration of, and passage of a budget, under Measure L, the 
mayor would possess line-item veto power, which means that he or she would have the power to 
unilaterally strike specific portions of the council’s approved budget in part or in entirety.130  
 
3. New Executive Powers – The Mayoral Veto Power 
 
In addition to the mayor’s existing authority to propose ordinances and resolutions for the 
city council to consider, Measure L would give the mayor veto power over any ordinances the 
council passed.131 This mayoral veto power is akin to the veto power of other executive heads, 
such as the president and the governor.132 
 
Measure L would limit the mayor’s veto power.133 Specifically, the mayor would not 
have veto power over “urgency” ordinances—those that would either take effect immediately 
upon adoption or less than 30 days after adoption—relating to an election, an emergency, or an 
ordinance adopted pursuant to a state law.134 In addition, the mayor would lack veto power over 
                                                 
124 Id. § 17 (amending SACRAMENTO, CAL. CHARTER, art. IV, § 40(b)(4)). 
125 Id.  
126 Forum, supra note 11 (statements of council member Steve Hansen and Nancy Miller, partner, Miller 
& Owen). 
127 Id. 
128 SACRAMENTO, CAL. CITY COUNCIL RES. NO. 2013-0362, EXHIBIT A, § 17 (2013), available at 
http://portal.cityofsacramento.org/~/media/Corporate/Files/City-
Clerk/Elections/07142014_MeasureText_Charter.pdf (amending SACRAMENTO, CAL. CHARTER, art. IV, 
§ 40(b)(6)). 
129 Id. 
130 Id. 
131 Id.; SACRAMENTO, CAL. CHARTER, art. IV, § 40(b)(5). 
132 AGAINST, supra note 101. 
133 SACRAMENTO, CAL. CITY COUNCIL RES. NO. 2013-0362, EXHIBIT A, § 21 (2013), available at 
http://portal.cityofsacramento.org/~/media/Corporate/Files/City-
Clerk/Elections/07142014_MeasureText_Charter.pdf (adding SACRAMENTO, CAL. CHARTER, art. IV, § 
47). 
134Id.; SACRAMENTO, CAL. CHARTER, art. III, § 32(g). 
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ordinances adopting the recommendations of the Independent Citizens’ Redistricting 
Commission, which Measure L’s revisions would create.135 
 
The mayor would be required to review all adopted ordinances and resolutions and 
approve or veto them within ten days of the city council’s adoption.136 If the mayor were to take 
no action on a measure, it would be deemed approved.137 If the mayor were to exercise the veto 
power, however, he or she must include an explanation of the basis for that decision.138 The 
council would have 30 days to reconsider a vetoed matter, but could only override the mayor’s 
veto if the reconsidered ordinance or resolution receives at least six council votes in favor of its 
adoption.139 
 
4. City Manager Appointment 
 
A significant new authority under Measure L would be the mayor’s right to appoint the 
city manager, a power currently vested in the city council.140 While the city council’s right to 
confirm the appointee would restrict this power, the mayor’s ability to remove the city manager 
would not be subject to any outside approval and would not require good cause.141 Furthermore, 
Measure L would require the mayor to hold an open meeting at which citizens may ask questions 
regarding the qualifications of the candidates for city manager before making an appointment.142 
 
5. Community Interaction  
 
If enacted, Measure L would require that the mayor address the citizens of Sacramento on 
an annual basis through a “State of the City” address.143 Similar to the executive addresses of the 
president and governors, the mayor’s State of the City statement would not just address the 
                                                 
135 SACRAMENTO, CAL. CITY COUNCIL RES. NO. 2013-0362, EXHIBIT A, § 21 (2013), available at 
http://portal.cityofsacramento.org/~/media/Corporate/Files/City-
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142 SACRAMENTO, CAL. CHARTER, art. V, § 60. 
143 SACRAMENTO, CAL. CITY COUNCIL RES. NO. 2013-0362, EXHIBIT A, § 7 (2013), available at 
http://portal.cityofsacramento.org/~/media/Corporate/Files/City-
Clerk/Elections/07142014_MeasureText_Charter.pdf (amending SACRAMENTO, CAL. CHARTER, art. IV, 
§ 40(b)(2)). 
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general status of city government, but would also include the mayor’s policy recommendations 
for the coming year.144 Measure L would also require the mayor to host and participate in at least 
two “town hall” meetings each year as a means of receiving public input.145 Measure L does not 
indicate how the mayor should utilize such public input in formulating ordinances or policy.146 
 
C. The City Manager: Article V 
 
Measure L seeks to significantly alter the role and authorities prescribed to the city 
manager.147 No longer appointed by the city council, the city manager would be appointed by the 
mayor, with confirmation by the council.148 Specifically, the city council would have ten 
business days to either confirm or reject a mayoral city manager appointee.149 Failure to confirm 
or reject would constitute approval.150  
 
Measure L most dramatically seeks to alter the process by which the city manager may be 
removed from office.151 If approved by the voters, under Measure L the city manager would be 
subject to dismissal per the mayor, without council notification or approval.152 This proposed 
change is in stark contrast to the charter’s current procedure for removal of the city manager, 
which prohibits such action unless at least six members of the city council vote in favor of such 
removal.153 The current charter specifies that no city manager may be removed within the first 
twelve months of his or her term of office, except for cause.154 This provision would no longer 
exist if Measure L is enacted.155 
 
Functionally, the overall role of the city manager in citywide government would be 
dramatically altered from the position’s current status.156 No longer would the city manager be 
the city’s chief executive officer, but would become the city’s chief administrative officer.157 
Similarly, the charter’s overall description of the position’s purpose would be amended to read 
that the city manager is “acting on the mayor’s behalf and in furtherance of the mayor’s powers” 
when he or she carries out the position’s duties.158 
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148 Id. 
149 Id. 
150 Id. 
151 Id. 
152 Id. 
153 Id. § 25 (deleting SACRAMENTO, CAL. CHARTER, art. V, § 63). 
154 SACRAMENTO, CAL. CHARTER, art. V, § 63 (citing “incompetence, malfeasance, misfeasance or 
neglect of duty” as reasons for removal in the first year). 
155 SACRAMENTO, CAL. CITY COUNCIL RES. NO. 2013-0362, EXHIBIT A, § 25 (2013), available at 
http://portal.cityofsacramento.org/~/media/Corporate/Files/City-
Clerk/Elections/07142014_MeasureText_Charter.pdf (deleting SACRAMENTO, CAL. CHARTER, art. V, § 
63). 
156 Id. § 23 (amending SACRAMENTO, CAL. CHARTER, art. V, § 61). 
157 Id. 
158 Id. 
 156 
 
 
D. The Annual Budget: Article IX 
 
In addition to transferring the power to propose the budget from the city manager to the 
mayor, Measure L would establish the Office of the Independent Budget Analyst. 159 The city 
council would be responsible for appointing the head of that office, whose duties would be “to 
assist and advise the city council in conducting budgetary inquiries and in making budgetary 
decisions.”160 The independent budget analyst would be subject to removal by the council, at any 
time with or without cause.161 
 
The city council would be required to hold a minimum of two public hearings on the 
proposed budget within a specified timeframe.162 Upon the city council’s request, the 
independent budget analyst would provide an unbiased analysis of the mayor’s proposed 
budget.163 Once these procedures are complete, the city council would be required to adopt a 
budget no less than 30 days before the start of each fiscal year.164  
 
As discussed previously, the mayor would have the ability to approve or veto the budget, 
or exercise a line-item veto.165 The only limitation placed on the mayor’s line-item veto power 
would be the restriction that he or she may not veto any portion of the proposed budget relating 
to the city council’s own internal expenditures.166 Once the mayor’s review of the budget was 
complete, any sections approved would become effective immediately.167  
 
Measure L would clarify that the city’s annual budget may be amended, revised, or 
modified at any point during the fiscal year, so long as such an amendment, revision, or 
modification follows the procedure outlined above.168 
 
E. Other Major Charter Changes 
 
Measure L would also add several significant sections to the charter related to ethics and 
government transparency.169 
 
                                                 
159 Id. § 17 (amending SACRAMENTO, CAL. CHARTER, art. IV, § 40(b)(4)); Id. § 29 (amending 
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1. Reapportionment and Redistricting 
 
Measure L seeks to establish a nine-member independent redistricting commission to 
establish the boundaries of city council districts, thereby removing that power from the city 
council.170 The city council would have to pass an ordinance that establishes the commission, 
denotes qualifications required of members, and establishes a process by which members shall be 
appointed to serve on the commission no later than 180 days after voters approve Measure L.171 
The city council and the mayor would be precluded from taking part in any commission member 
appointments.172 Upon conclusion of a regular United States census, the commission would 
examine council district boundaries to ensure compliance with population regulations, and adopt 
modifications to those boundaries, if necessary.173 Under the existing charter, this is a duty the 
city council holds.174 Furthermore, any boundary modifications the commission made would be 
sent to the council, and the council would be required to adopt the commission’s findings 
without making changes to them.175  
 
2. Ethics and Transparency 
 
Measure L would require the city council to take two direct actions to ensure ethical 
conduct and transparency.176 Specifically, the city council would be required to adopt a “Code of 
Ethics and Conduct” and a “Sunshine Ordinance.”177 
 
a. Code of Ethics and Conduct 
 
If approved, Measure L would require the city council to develop and adopt a “Code of 
Ethics and Conduct,” for all city officials and appointed members of boards, commissions, and 
committees.178 The council would be required to adopt this code of conduct within 180 days of 
Measure L’s passage.179 Aside from the requirement that the code include a procedure for 
removing any elected official or appointed member from office who “substantially violates” the 
code, no other substantive details of what the code would or should contain are included in 
Measure L’s text.180 Similarly, the text of Measure L also does not stipulate any consequences if 
the council fails to adopt a code of ethics.181 
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 Measure L would also require the city council to adopt an ordinance establishing an 
ethics committee for the purpose of the ongoing review and monitoring of the “Code of Ethics 
and Conduct.”182 In creating this committee, the council would have the discretion to determine 
the required qualifications and conditions of service of future committee members, including any 
compensation for service, reimbursement for expenses, terms of office, and methods for 
appointment and removal from office, so costs are currently unknown.183 Measure L clarifies 
that this newly established ethics committee “is not a board, commission, or advisory agency for 
purposes of Article XV or § 40.”184 Article XV of the charter defines what boards, commissions, 
and advisory agencies are, and delegates powers and responsibilities.185 Section 40 delegates the 
power to appoint or remove members of boards, commissions, and advisory agencies to the 
mayor.186 Thus, Measure L’s articulation that the ethics committee is not a board, commission, 
or advisory agency seems to be have been included simply to make clear that it will not have 
substantive powers.187 
 
b. Sunshine Ordinance 
 
In addition, if Measure L is approved, the city council would be required to adopt a so-
called “Sunshine Ordinance” within 180 days of its passage.188 The stated purpose of this 
ordinance would be to “liberally provide for the public’s access to city government meetings, 
documents, and records.”189 It is not apparent how Measure L’s Sunshine Ordinance would 
differ from existing open government laws, as Measure L does not specify the precise content of 
the future ordinance.190 
 
The preeminent existing law that requires transparency in local government proceedings 
is the Ralph M. Brown Act (the Brown Act), which the Legislature approved in 1953.191 The 
Brown Act statutorily guarantees the public’s right of access to local government meetings.192 
The Brown Act also places significant restrictions on how local governments may convene to 
                                                 
182 SACRAMENTO, CAL. CITY COUNCIL RES. NO. 2013-0362, EXHIBIT A, § 15 (2013), available at 
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conduct public business as a means of ensuring the public’s right of access to such 
proceedings.193 
 
Because Measure L does not specify the exact provisions of the Sunshine Ordinance, it is 
unclear at this time if the intention is that the ordinance should exceed the requirements of 
existing law.194 It should be noted, however, that local governments do have the ability to impose 
requirements of open government and transparency that exceed the requirements of the Brown 
Act.195 
 
3. Voter Authorization Provisions 
 
Finally, Measure L also includes provisions requiring prior voter authorization for future 
changes to certain sections of the charter.196 For example, the proposed amendments related to 
reapportionment and redistricting, if passed, could only be amended if a majority of the voters 
held as such in a regular election.197 The rest of Measure L’s proposed changes would “sunset,” 
or expire, on December 31, 2020, and would be automatically repealed and removed from the 
charter.198 However, Measure L would require the council to place a measure on the ballot at an 
election no later than November 3, 2020 to allow voters to consider whether to make Measure 
L’s changes permanent.199  
 
V. CONSTITUTIONAL AND CITY CHARTER IMPLICATIONS 
 
A. Single-Subject Rule 
 
The California Constitution imposes a single-subject rule on all initiatives put before the 
electorate.200 This rule applies to all initiatives, whether they are put on the statewide ballot or a 
local ballot.201 The single-subject rule says an initiative is permissible only if “all of its parts are 
reasonably germane to each other, and to the general purpose or object of the initiative.”202 This 
rule, however, applies only to initiatives, and not to other types of ballot measures.203  
 
The California Constitution provides two ways to amend a city charter with the voters for 
approval: (1) by an initiative qualified for the ballot through the procedures outlined in the 
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California Election Code or (2) by a ballot measure sponsored by the governing body of a 
municipality.204  
 
By definition, an initiative is “the power of the electors to propose statutes and 
amendments to the Constitution and to adopt or reject them.” 205 The California Election Code 
sets forth the initiative process whereby the electorate may draft and approve laws.206 An 
initiative may only be put before the electorate for approval after satisfying various requirements, 
including having the Secretary of State certify its language and obtaining a specified number of 
signatures when the initiative is circulated for pre-ballot approval.207 
 
Similarly, the California Constitution vests power in a city’s governing body to propose 
by ballot measure ordinances and changes to a city’s charter.208 The distinctive differences 
between the power vested in the electorate and the power vested in a governing body are the 
name attributed to each proposal (‘initiative’ for the former, ‘ballot measure’ for the latter) and 
in the process by which such proposals make it to the ballot.209 
 
Thus, given the clear language of the Constitution, a ballot measure proposed by a city’s 
governing body is not, by definition, an initiative.210 Because Measure L’s origin lies with the 
city council and not the electorate, it is by definition a ballot measure, and is therefore not 
subject to the limitations of the single-subject rule.211 
 
B. Charter Revision versus Charter Amendment 
 
A city’s charter may be changed via one of two methods: by amendment or by 
revision.212 Whether a change is an amendment or a revision is determined by how substantial 
the proposed change would be.213 Furthermore, a charter amendment may be proposed by the 
electorate through the initiative process or by a ballot measure sponsored by the city’s governing 
body.214 Conversely, a charter revision may only be proposed by the city’s governing body 
through a ballot measure.215 
 
“Although the Constitution does not define the terms ‘amendment’ or ‘revision,’ the 
courts have developed some guidelines” for their interpretation.216 An amendment is a less 
substantial change; one that does not substantially alter the Constitution (or a charter) in any 
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meaningful quantitative or qualitative fashion.217 Conversely, a revision is a more substantial, 
far-reaching change.218 The courts have developed a two-part test for determining whether a 
proposed change is simply an amendment, or if it rises to the level of a revision.219 That test 
measures both the quantitative and qualitative effects that the proposed measure would have on a 
charter, and if the effect of either category is substantial, the courts will find the proposed 
measure to be a revision.220 
 
 The same provision of the California Constitution that authorizes a city to adopt a 
charter also authorizes the governing body of a city to amend or revise the city’s charter.221 
Conversely, only the power to amend a charter, not revise it, is given to the voters.222 Thus, a 
revision to a city’s charter may only be accomplished when a city’s governing body votes to 
place the revision on the ballot, and it is subsequently approved by the voters.223 This is why the 
original attempt to place a citizen-proposed strong-mayor initiative on the ballot was deemed 
unconstitutional, because it constituted a substantial revision, not a simple amendment.224 
Because Measure L also seeks to accomplish a revision to city’s charter, it was properly placed 
on the ballot as a ballot measure sponsored by the city council, not through the initiative 
process.225 
 
VI. PUBLIC POLICY CONSIDERATIONS 
 
 Measure L’s main support comes from the group “Sacramento Tomorrow,” which 
includes developer Angelo Tsakopoulos and Mayor Kevin Johnson.226 Council member Steve 
Hansen, who represents central Sacramento, Land Park, and part of Natomas, leads “Stop the 
Power Grab,” the coalition of Measure L opponents.227 Both sides are passionate about their 
arguments for and against the measure.228 Neither side, however, has undertaken a fiscal analysis 
of the measure. As a result, there are open questions regarding how much different portions of 
the revision will cost.229 
 
Proponents admit the “city is well-served by its city manager and current form of 
government,” but believe Measure L would be an improvement.230 Opponents are not swayed; 
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with recent successes under the current structure, like the development of the new Kings 
basketball arena, they seek more concrete proof that a strong-mayor system would be better able 
to accomplish similar tasks.231 This section will examine the arguments on both sides of Measure 
L.232 
 
A. The City Council: Article III 
 
 Under the strong-mayor government, the city council would continue to have eight 
members elected from districts each representing one-eighth of the city, but the mayor would no 
longer have a council seat or vote.233 Some argue the mayor could get the authority to cast a tie-
breaker vote, since there will be an even number of council members.234 Those opposing 
Measure L insist allowing the mayor to vote in the event of a tie is inappropriate.235  
 
At this time, however, there is no protocol in event of a tie under Measure L.236 A vote of 
four-to-four would mean an ordinance would not pass.237 Proponents say this probably will not 
be a problem, or will only be a minor issue, although admit both sides are speculating.238 They 
point out that five votes will be required just as in the existing system.239 But, five votes under 
the proposed system require the support of 62.5 percent of the council, rather than just over 55 
percent, which opponents say is higher than appropriate.240 It is interesting to note that if 
Sacramento already had a five-vote requirement and a non-voting mayor, Measure L would not 
be on the ballot since the five-four vote would have been a tie without the mayor’s vote .241 
 
Although each member’s representation and vote would not change, they would lose 
some of their authority.242 For example, the city council would no longer appoint the city 
manager, and the mayor would be able to veto city council-approved ordinances and budgets.243 
Because the mayor will have more power at the expense of the city council as a whole, Measure 
L opponents assert council members will have difficulty serving their constituents in the most 
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positive way.244 They decry the shift in power away from nine people to one person—the 
mayor.245 
 
There is an emphasis on interaction between the city council and community through 
Measure L’s creation of a Neighborhood Advisory Committee.246 The text of the measure, 
however, leaves the details of this committee completely open.247 Supporters insist this was to 
make Measure L more comprehendible and ensure it did not get bogged down with minor details 
as past versions did.248 Opponents are a little more cynical.249 They call the committee and other 
components of the measure that require future ordinances “sweeteners,” saying each could be 
implemented by ordinance now, without a vote on Measure L, if they were truly important.250 
They believe way the measure is written, however, makes the committee seem as if it will be 
non-substantive because it is not a “commission,” which would have the power to make 
changes.251 Still, supporters maintain that the committee will be an integral part of the city 
government because its meetings will be open to the public and the city council may take its 
suggestions under advisement.252  
 
Measure L’s opponents do not believe it is necessary to change the power structure 
because the city council and mayor have worked together to achieve so many positive things, 
including creating a budget surplus and keeping the Kings in Sacramento.253 Supporters assert, 
however, that balancing the budget, creating jobs, and reducing crime would be streamlined with 
a strong-mayor system.254 
 
B. The Mayor: Article IV 
 
In Sacramento’s current council-manager system, the mayor is a “figurehead,” attending 
ribbon cuttings and promoting the city for tourism.255 Yet, citizens expect the mayor to solve 
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citywide problems and take responsibility for government decisions.256 Measure L supporters, 
including former mayor Phil Isenberg, believe the measure will bring the mayor’s duties and 
abilities better in line with public expectations.257 
 
1. From Figurehead to CEO 
 
Measure L proponents decry the fact that the city manager—currently the equivalent of a 
chief executive officer—is not elected.258 That is why they want the elected mayor to take on 
CEO-type duties, including managing police and fire services.259 But, the mayor may not have 
any business or management experience, which is why cities hire professional managers.260 
Therefore, Measure L is a hybrid, where the city can benefit from the manager’s expertise and 
the mayor’s accountability, according to supporters.261 
 
Consolidation of power could also make city departments more effective, according to 
supporters, because the mayor would have a greater ability to hold them accountable than the 
city manager can while he or she is beholden to the varied interests of council members.262 
Opponents see this as an opportunity for the mayor to do whatever he or she wishes with city 
services, without any accountability until, possibly, the next election.263  
 
The term limits imposed on the mayor would, according to supporters, provide a check 
on the mayor’s power.264 The city manager is unelected, but Measure L proponents prefer 
placing that much power into the hands of someone who can be removed through an election or, 
if he or she is reelected, at the end of a set number of terms.265 Some opposed to Measure L do 
not believe a vote every four years is enough to balance the amount of power that would be 
vested in the mayor.266 Others do not like term limits because placing an artificial limit on the 
time an official can be in office “inappropriately constrains the options of the electorate.”267 
 
2. Mayoral Veto Power 
 
 Although the mayor would be able to veto city council decisions, Measure L proponents 
note that this does not give ultimate power to the mayor because the veto can be overridden.268 
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But, six members, or 75 percent of the council, would have to vote to override the veto, which 
would give the mayor more power than any Governor or the President because the supermajority 
required is larger than that at the State or Federal level.269  
 
 How a mayor may use the veto power is unknown, but supporters say it removes any 
“temporary block to council actions, or conversely, a temporary block to the mayor’s actions.”270 
Former mayor Phil Isenberg speculated that it will be reserved for fundamental issues.271 Now, 
there is an incentive for the mayor and city council to not make sweeping, and perhaps 
controversial, decisions because one would need the support of four others.272 Veto power may 
thus encourage more change.273 
 
The community may not want the mayor to have this power; a citizen-run committee 
engaged to make recommendations regarding a strong-mayor government in Sacramento voted 
overwhelmingly to condemn mayoral veto power.274 Of course, Measure L opponents also feel it 
is an inappropriate amount of power to vest in one person.275 
 
3. Appointment Power 
 
Measure L proponents emphasize the positive checks and balances that would occur if 
the mayor appointed the city manager with council concurrence and a public meeting about the 
proposed city manager’s qualifications.276 Those against Measure L, however, stress the fact that 
the mayor can remove the city manager at will can cut against these checks and balances.277  
 
The mayor’s appointment power under Measure L would be more limited than under past 
strong-mayor proposals in Sacramento.278 This revision, however, still divides city employees 
into those responsible to the mayor and those who answer to the city council, which could make 
the city’s hierarchy confusing.279 Community members who prefer the current council-manager 
government see advantages in a “unified structure…[with] a single consolidated group of 
professional staff under the direction of the city manager, who is responsible to the full city 
council,” including the mayor.280 
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4. Community Interaction  
 
 Since under Measure L, the mayor would no longer be a voting member of the city 
council, opponents decry that the mayor can choose not to attend meetings.281 They assert a 
mayor could theoretically never hear the concerns of Sacramento citizens if he or she did not go 
to city council meetings, and could make decisions based solely on meetings with private 
individuals or groups.282 There could be “far less public access to the mayor.”283 This would also 
be a circumvention of the Brown Act if the mayor does not attend meetings for which public 
access is required under the act.284 Of course, even if a mayor does attend meetings, he or she is 
not required to take community comments made at those meetings under consideration when 
making decisions.285  
 
Supporters of Measure L counter criticism about the omission of Brown Act standards by 
pointing to the power of the electorate to remove the mayor if he or she is not responsive to the 
people.286 Also, the mayor and council members alike will continue to engage members of the 
public outside of meetings, which very few citizens attend.287 That engagement, coupled with 
additions to mayoral power, may actually be more productive according to proponents, since 
members of the public often comment at meetings regarding topics over which the mayor and 
city council have no power.288 “Government provides an endless number of ways to comment,” 
and proponents point to the new comment forums available under Measure L, including two 
town hall meetings each year in which the mayor must participate.289 
 
C. The City Manager: Article V 
 
 Supporters of Measure L stress that the city manager will still provide his or her expertise 
to the mayor, so Sacramento will still have professional guidance.290 They say the only issue is 
whether a voter believes the mayor should or should not direct the city manager.291 
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If the city manager is mayor-appointed, however, those against Measure L believe the 
manager will work to support only the mayor’s goals, not those of the city council or the 
electorate.292 Some have even said the city manager may become a de facto chief of staff to the 
mayor.293 Since the city manager would no longer have a one-year grace period during which he 
or she could not be removed, the person in that position could feel pressure to follow the mayor, 
regardless of the reason or outcome.294 
 
One item that has not been addressed is whether the city manager’s compensation will 
change if the position encompasses fewer duties. Former mayor Heather Fargo speculated that 
the city manager’s pay will not decrease, but the mayor would probably get a raise so that he or 
she is not making less than the manager, who would be the mayor’s subordinate.295  
 
D. The Annual Budget: Article IX 
 
 The mayor would create and present the budget if Measure L is approved, which means 
either the budget would be more voter-influenced because the mayor is elected or the budget 
would be full of favors to friends and donors, depending on which side of the debate is 
speaking.296 
  
It could be easier for special interests to influence just one person wielding budgetary 
power, rather than an entire city council.297 Since deep-pocketed donors have contributed to the 
campaign supporting Measure L—developer Angelo Tsakopoulos has donated $100,000, the 
California Association of Realtors has contributed just under $50,000, Niello Co. has backed the 
campaign with $25,000, and Mark Friedman, a Kings owner, has given more than $14,000—
perhaps the monetary influence that opponents are worried about is already taking effect.298 
“Access [to leaders] would be focused and limited to certain individuals” with a lot of money, 
according to Measure L’s opposition.299 Yet supporters insist special interests will still need to 
work with all eight council members, although they recognize the measure will streamline a 
currently “sluggish bureaucracy where…to get something done, they often have to convince at 
least five city council members, which can take a lot of time and money.”300 
 
As with any other council vote, the mayor would have veto power, and overriding that 
veto with a supermajority could prove difficult.301 The creation of an independent budget analyst 
could provide a balance against the mayor’s power.302 If the analyst makes recommendations 
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that the city council adopts, the mayor may be less likely to use a line-item veto against those 
recommendations or an overall veto against the budget.303 Although Measure L creates the 
analyst position, it fails to make recommendations regarding his or her qualifications and does 
not consider the cost of hiring a new department head.304 Therefore, it is unclear if an 
independent budget analyst will actually be appointed or whether the position is financially 
feasible if Measure L passes.305 
 
E. Other Major Charter Changes 
 
Measure L will require the city council to fill in some of the details left out of its text, but 
will also allow voters to alter the provisions during future general elections.306 
 
1. Required Ordinances 
 
Several of the main Measure L charter alterations require the council to pass a separate 
ordinance within six months of the measure’s passage.307 These include the creation of 
committees for redistricting and ethics, as well as a Sunshine Ordinance.308 Proponents of 
Measure L did not prescribe the parameters of these programs in the measure because voters 
found prior versions of strong-mayor initiatives overwhelming when they included all of these 
details.309  
 
This reasoning does not comfort opponents, who say the “trust us and wait” argument 
shows a lack of substance in the reforms.310 Council member Hansen foresees a “delicate dance” 
to create ordinances substantive enough so that they have a purpose, but not too substantive so 
that they might be vetoed.311 Since the ordinances do not require a charter change, council 
member Hansen would prefer to create substantive ordinances that reform ethics, streamline 
governance, and change election rules without a measure half-heartedly commanding the city 
council to do so.312 
 
// 
// 
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2. Amendment by Ballot 
 
Measure L’s charter changes can be amended through future initiatives or measures 
placed on the ballot, which could help to close any gaps that surface.313 For example, if the 
measure passes and tie votes in the city council become a problem, voters can solve the issue 
with a general election ballot measure.314 This was an issue that San Diego voters fixed when 
they permanently approved their city’s strong-mayor system.315 
 
If Measure L passes, voters may also choose not to keep a strong-mayor government 
when the bill sunsets in 2020.316 The provision is similar to how other cities adopted their strong-
mayor systems.317 Some feel that the sunset date provides false hope for those who dislike the 
form of governance; after all the arguments on Measure L, they say voters will be less likely to 
change the charter because they don’t want a repeat of “this agony.”318 Opponents do not want 
the next six years to be an experiment, and assert that such a major change to the charter should 
be permanent or not happen at all.319 A few cynics believe the sunset might be designed so that 
the strong-mayor system only benefits Mayor Johnson and not his successors.320 
 
VII. CONCLUSION 
 
Ultimately, the decision Sacramento voters make may not really alter the way the city 
government works.321 Researchers have found the council-manager structure and the strong-
mayor system are fairly equal in terms of ability to implement citizen-supported policies.322 Both 
forms of government generally conform to their constituents’ desires because they are equally 
responsive to their communities.323 
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 Measure L’s proponents insist the revision would create a better, more modern form of 
government that will reduce “bureaucratic roadblocks.”324 Opponents recognize the popularity of 
Mayor Johnson and understand why voters would give him more governmental control, but fear 
the measure places too much power in the position, which voters may not like as much when a 
less-popular mayor is in charge.325  
 
Regardless of the way they vote, voters should bear in mind that Measure L proposes a 
substantial revision to Sacramento’s existing charter, and the breadth of the proposal warrants 
careful consideration of the specific changes.326 
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